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WOMEN STATE LEGISLATORS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE 
EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT 
By Roger Handberg* and Wanda Lowery** 
This study reports on female state legislators' perceptions of 
the techniques used by lobbyists in the context of the struggle 
over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).I Female legislators 
were chosen for examination because the ERA has presented a 
particularly safient issue for politically active women;2 therefore, 
these legislators have public positions on ERA. This fact permits 
examination into several propositions found in political science 
literature on legislator-lobbyist relations. 
The primary proposition examined here is that pressure (or 
interest) groups or individual constituents will contact supportive 
or neutral legislators rather than known opponents.3 At the same 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Central Florida. B.A., Florida State 
University, 1966; Ph.D., University of North Carolina, 1970 . 
•• Teacher, Brevard County (Florida). B.A., Florida Technological University, 1972; 
M.P.P., Florida Technological University, 1977. 
1. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CaNST. proposed amend. XXVll, § 1. 
2. The importance of ERA for female legislators is still high but for somewhat differ-
ent reasons than in the past. The ERA ratification struggle, despite the time extension, 
has run into trouble. Four states have passed rescission legislation, and the senates of two 
more have moved for rescission. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1979, at 41, col. 1. The 
legislators interviewed for this study reported that tentative rescission efforts have also 
occurred in at least fourteen other states. Thus, even in those states that have ratified 
ERA, controversy over the issue in the legislatures has not subsided. 
3. H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, LOBBYING: INTERACTION AND INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN STATE 
LEGISLATURES 130 (1969). The strategic calculation made is that contacting opponents is 
both a waste of resources and ultimately counter-productive. An example of the latter 
situation would be when a previously opposed but inactive legislator becomes actively 
opposed because of the contacts by lobbyists. [d. 
609 
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time, we will look at the methods used by lobbyists to contact 
opposing legislators.4 Based on the existing literature,5 one would 
expect that the predominant modes of contact would be relatively 
impersonal, for example, letters and petitions. Personal contacts, 
such as office visits, are less likely unless the legislator is neutral 
or favorably predisposed toward the lobbyist's position.6 
The purpose of this study is to explore how the female 
legislator-ERA lobbyist behavior compares to the usual 
legislator-lobbyist pattern.7 
I. THE FEMALE LEGISLATOR: TARGET FOR ERA 
LOBBYISTS 
For obvious reasons related to political survival, legislators 
are presumed to be relatively sensitive to constituency pressures.s 
What usually occurs is that the legislator is approached by a 
variety of groups who are interested in specific policy issues.9 
4. [d. at 176. And see, L. MILLBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LoBBYISTS 392-93 (1963). 
5. D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 352-91 (1951). 
6. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES, 279-
301 (3rd ed. 1977); L. RIEsELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS 194-213 (1973). 
7. Lobbyist-legislator interactions have been a recurrent focus of attention in the 
legislative behavior literature. For a personalized view, see Katherine Hagen Sebo, On 
Being a Woman in the North Carolina General Assembly (paper presented at the 1975 
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, Tenn.). Professor 
Sebo was both a professor of political science and a North Carolina State Senator during 
the ERA ratification struggle in 1975. 
8. A legislator's sensitivity to constituency pressures as expressed by lobbyists has 
been found to vary, depending upon the legislator's career aspirations and policy goals. 
R. FENNo, HOME STYLE 171-213 (1978). The relationship, though, is not a simple one-to-
one linkage. In fact, one legislative role model, the "trustee," explicitly assumes that the 
legislator does not always represent the constituency's short-run desires as expressed by 
the lobbyist. The legislator can legitimately substitute his or her supposedly broader or 
more reflective judgment for the moment's passions. J. W AHLKE, H. EULAu, W. BUCHANAN 
& L. FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 267-86 (1962). Consistent with this view, the 
legislators may perceive their constituents as having no coherent, expressed opinion on 
most legislative matters. Some issues are selected by the legislator as having high interest 
for the general population, but such issues tend to be relatively few. 
9. Legislators are often confronted by very intense and emotional groups, but fortun-
ately for the politician the groups are interested in a particular issue rather than a series 
of issues. Therefore, the legislator can often deal with each issue separately, usually 
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Although specific in content, the ERA represents a general issue 
with high importance to various segments of the population. 
Female legislators are important targets of pro- and anti-
ERA lobbyists, not because they represent the decisive legislative 
votes, but for other substantive and symbolic reasons. Substan-
tively, the female legislators are in some stateslO the floor leaders 
for the ratification effort-a role apparently not sought by male 
legislators. II In addition, the women provided an information 
source for supportive male legislators, and served as a conduit for 
further information from outside groups.· Symbolically, women 
legislators are seen as important alternative role models for less 
politically involved women. 12 
II. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 
A. CONFORMITY TO EXPECTED PATTERN 
As a group, the women legislators who responded to our sur-
veyl3 were heavily in favor of the amendment with seventy-two 
without seriously offending other groups. These single issue groups are often unwilling to 
tolerate compromise, because their issue agenda is so short. ld. at 301-02; R. FENNO, supra 
note 8, at 157-60; Miller, Party Government and Saliency of Congress, 26 PuB. OPINION 
Q. 542-43 (1962). 
10. In Florida, the amendment was introduced each session by Senator Lori Wilson. 
Senator Wilson was for the first half of her term the only woman in the Senate. 
11. Although for some males their objections were apparently based upon symbolic 
considerations. This interpretation of the male legislators' motivations was offered by 
several women legislators involved in the study. 
12. This symbolic function has a two-edged character to it in that women state 
legislators have taken both pro-and anti-ERA stances. 
13. The data used here consists of the responses of women state legislators to a mail 
survey conducted during the summer of 1977. A list of all 688 women legislators in the 
United States was obtained from the National Women's Education Fund. The return rate 
for two mailings was 60%, for a total of 418 usable questionnaires. Comparatively speak-
ing, state senators are over-represented in the sample return (73, or 71%) as opposed to 
state representatives (333, or 57%). Two were returned from Nebraska, where the legisla-
ture is unicameral, while ten replies were unclassifiable. 
The sample broke down as Democratic-61.7%, Republican-34.7%, and five respon-
dents were either nonpartisan or independent in terms of party label. The respondents 
were relatively inexperienced as legislators at the time of the survey. Twenty-nine percent 
had less than a year's experience, while another twenty-two percent had served three years 
or less. This general pattern reflects the 1974 election when a large number of Republican 
incumbents were defeated in the aftermath of Watergate. This level of experience is fairly 
3
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percent indicating ERA support and seventeen percent reporting 
that they were opposed.14 
In terms of lobbyist contacts, we looked first at the legisla-
tors' general exposure to the lobbying processl5 and then at 
whether the lobbying efforts were congruent with the legislators' 
views. We were concerned with the relative frequency with which 
certain lobbying techniques were used to contact the legislator.16 
In conformity with earlier studies, the anti-ERA forces had 
a pattern of using more impersonal modes of approach than their 
pro-ERA counterparts. For example, personal visits, which are 
the most direct, immediate approaches to the legislator, were the 
method least used by anti-ERA lobbyists. Anti-ERA lobbyists 
were reported as favoring the relatively impersonal mode of tele-
grams and letters, followed by telephone, petitions, public meet-
ings, and personal visits.17 Pro-ERA lobbyists also preferred let-
ters and telegrams, then telephone, public meetings, personal 
typical of state legislatures, which are often characterized by high turnover. J. SCHLESIN-
GER, AMBmoN AND POLITICS (1966); Soule, Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior 
of Incumbent State Legislators, 13 MIDWEST J. POLITICAL SCI. 439-54 (1969). 
Demographically, the population reported here is overwhelmingly white collar and 
self-employed (61%) (with the category of housewife next at 28.5%). This pattern contrasts 
with an earlier sample in that the white collar groups have, in terms of percentage, almost 
doubled.!. DIAMOND, SEX RoLES IN THE STATE HOUSE 177 (1977). In contrast to another 
study, most of the women here report an occupation other than housewife before election 
to the legislature. See, e.g., J. KiRKPATRICK, POLITICAL WOMAN 61 (1974). Educationally, 
the legislators identified here are college graduates with some graduate work (67.3%). This 
group compares favorably to the Kirkpatrick study which found that most women state 
legislators had an under-utilized college education. Id. at 29. In addition, the legislators 
identified here are younger as a group than Diamond's earlier regional sample. The change 
in the age distribution occurs in the oldest and youngest categories. Nearly twice (23%) 
as many occur in the 21-39 year group as Diamond reported (12%) while in the 60-69 year 
group, the results are 11% to Diamond's 26%. One can hypothesize several alternative 
explanations for this shift in the pattern; i.e., changing fertility patterns, increased politi-
cal career motivations among younger aspirants, or increased difficulty of electoral compe-
tition for older candidates.!. DIAMOND, supra at 177. 
14. The relatively small number of identifiable opponents (there were 55) limits 
analysis somewhat but still allows certain conclusions. Analysis of several alternative 
hypotheses is precluded because of the attenuation of the sample which occurs when 
controls are used, because the number of legislators in a particular subcategory is fewer 
than five. 
15. H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, supra note 3, at 176. Much of the information in the area 
is derived from studies done on congressional constituent contacts. 
16. This ranking is based on reporting by the legislator. Each legislator was asked to 
rank various methods from most frequent to least frequent-a total of five categories. 
17. The percentages were: telegrams and letters, 68.2%; telephone, 34.9%; petitions, 
20.1%; public meetings, 10.8%; and personal visits, 10.3%. 
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visits, and petitions. ls Since most of the female legislators are pro-
ERA it is not surprising that pro-ERA lobbyists had a much 
greater preference for personal visits than their anti-ERA coun-
terparts. 19 
The hypothesis that the legislators are confronted primarily 
with supportive lobbyist activities, because opponents to the 
views of the legislators save their energies and resources for more 
productive areas,20 was upheld in this study. What is apparent is 
a polar distribution of pro-ERA legislators predominantly seeing 
pro-ERA lobbyists with anti-ERA legislators predominantly 
seeing anti-ERA lobbyists.21 For example, over three quarters 
(76%) of our pro-ERA legislators reported that they predomi-
nantly saw pro-ERA lobbyists. Conversely, anti-ERA legislators 
reported that they overwhelmingly (90%) saw anti-ERA lobby-
ists. When the lobbyists were separated by sex, the pattern did 
not change. Given that the hypothesis' of ideological conformity 
was upheld, we then shifted our analytic focus to consider 
whether differences occurred in the type of lobbyist contact re-
ceived by pro- and anti-ERA women legislators. 
B. VARIATIONS FROM THE EXPECTED PATrERN 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the pattern of lobbyist behavior as 
seen by the two contrasting sets of legislators. Table 1 concerns 
activities by anti-ERA lobbyists while Table 2 covers pro-ERA 
lobbyists' activities. The first column represents the percentage 
of pro-ERA legislators who ranked the particular activity as ei-
ther first or second. The second presents the distribution of anti-
ERA legislators who made the same evaluation.22 
18. The percentages were: telegrams and letters, 61.5%; telephone, 39.8%; public 
meetings, 19.3%; personal visits, 18.5%; and petitions, 9.9%. 
19. 18.5% as against 10.3%. 
20. H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, supra note 3. 
21. Anti-ERA legislators, in fact, reported the greatest cross pressures from lobbyists 
opposed to their personal policy views. Given that the data is reported by the legislator, 
some misinformation may occur, but what is impressive is the direction and strength of 
the relationship. 
22. Both evaluation patterns are based upon the perceptions of the legislators; we 
have no empirical evidence to validate the rankings within the particular state or even at 
the national level. This does not invalidate the results, but is introduced as a caution. 
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Lobbyist 
Activities 
Visits 
Telephone 
Calls 
Letters 
Petitions 
Public 
Meetings 
TABLE 1 
ANTI-ERA LOBBYISTS 
Legislator View of ERA 
Favor 
5.8% 
11.7% 
70.6% 
8.4% 
6.1% 
Oppose 
20.5% 
13.9% 
53.2% 
5.4% 
11.1% 
N =246 
x:! = 14.04, P = .02 
gamma = - .228 
Cramer's V = .239 
N =266 
x:! = 6.651, P = .248 
gamma = - .264 
Cramer's V == .158 
N= 312 
x 2 == 12.06, P = .027 
gamma = .292 
Cramer's V == .201 
N=240 
x:! == 15.363, P = .001 
gamma == .447 
Cramer's V = .253 
N == 234 
x 2 == 5.909, p == .315 
gamma == - .122 
Cramer's V == .159 
In terms of anti-ERA lobbyist activity, the major differences 
between the two sets of legislators occurred in the category of 
personal visits. The expected pattern is for anti-ERA lobbyists to 
interact most actively on a personal basis with anti-ERA legisla-
tors, because visits involve a degree of personal interaction which 
can· prove stressful for persons opposed to the other's known 
views. Conversely, the more impersonal forms of behavior (letters 
and petitions) would be expected to be addressed to pro-ERA 
legislators. This separation process would allow one to lobby one's 
legislature but at a reduced psychic cost to both the legislator and 
the lobbyist.23 The aggregate pattern in Table 1 supports that line 
of reasoning. Anti-ERA lobbyists were clearly more active in per-
sonally approaching those legislators who at some level supported 
the lobbyists' views. 
23. One study related the stress experienced by some lt~gislators when confronting 
hostile (or unknown) constituents. The legislators tried to minimize the potentially stress-
ful contact .. R. FENNo, supra note 8, at 131. 
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TABLE 2 
PRo-ERA LOBBYISTS 
Legislator View of ERA 
Favo1' Oppose 
11.90 13.5'!t 
16.5'!t 11.40 
.16.7~~ 
1.9'1< 11.80. 
14.0% 22.9'!t 
N = 2lj6 
x:! = 3.22, Jl = .6tili 
gamma = .005 
Cramer's V = .112 
N=274 
x:! = 4.61, P = .465 
gamma = .035 
Cramer's V = .130 
N = 299 
x:! = 12.827, P = .0~5 
gamma = .261 
Cramer's V = .207 
N= 240 
x:! = 11.177, p = .048 
gamma = .041 
Cramer's V = .215 
N = 256 
x:! = 5.744, p = .332 
gamma = - .174 
Cramer's V = .15(} 
When the focus shifts to the activities of the pro-ERA con-
stituents, the pattern becomes more ambiguous. Pro-ERA lobby-
ists interacted more directly through visits with legislators re-
gardless of the legislators' personal views. Those lobbyists were 
apparently more likely to call on anti-ERA legislators than pro: 
ERA legislators. What makes the pattern interesting is that ex-
cept for phone calls, pro-ERA lobbyists were more prone to con-
tact anti-ERA legislators in personalized ways than the theory 
would predict. In terms of the more impersonal forms oflobbying, 
the pattern for petitions is the opposite of that expected. 
Explaining this behavior pattern is somewhat difficult since 
the particular data collection procedure is such that returning to 
the respondents is impossible. More important, the legislators 
were reporting their impressions of the activities of others whose 
strategic calculations can only be inferred. Nevertheless, a possi-
ble explanation is that pro-ERA lobbyists felt some necessity to 
develop or maintain what might be termed women's solidarity. 
That is, in the battle over ERA ratification or rescission, the 
7
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existence of anti-ERA female legislators is an embarrassment. 
ERA has been defined by many in the women's movement as a 
symbol of their fight for equality. Female legislators opposed to 
ERA become more than just a vote; they are a counter symbol. 
For example, at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act, 
no Black member of Congress opposed the bills. On that issue, 
the solidarity of the Black community was clear. By contrast, 
anti-ERA female legislators expose by their very existence the 
schisms within the women's movement. Therefore, in a counter-
point to the politics of the usual, the pro-ERA lobbyists actively 
pursued in a personal way legislators opposed to their policy posi-
tion. Very likely the symbolic nature of the issue raised is above 
the context of normal politics. For the anti-ERA lobbyists, the 
symbolic overtones inherent in the situation were less relevant, 
because their concern was with total votes. For them, male legis-
lators, not errant female legislators, were more important. 
ID. CONCLUSION 
The literature on legislator-lobbyist relations has concluded 
that like-minded talk to like-minded. Much of the contact with 
the legislator is through such impersonal sources that its ultimate 
impact is difficult to gauge. In the struggle over ERA the pattern 
holds, in that pro-ERA legislators interact more frequently with 
pro-ERA lobbyists, and anti-ERA legislators do the same with 
anti-ERA lobbyists. The major anomaly of the study occurs when 
one looks at the relationship between anti-ERA legislators and 
pro-ERA lobbyists. The usual pattern does not hold. The explan-
ation suggested here was premised upon the symbolic importance 
of female state legislators. A defmitive answer can come only 
through systematic study of the ERA lobbying process. As a 
group, female legislators will not hold the decisive votes in deter-
mining whether ERA is ratified, but they do represent an excel-
lent example of how the usual patterns of group-based politics do 
not always hold. 
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